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Abstract
Interpretational questions that arise in the Consistent Histories for-
mulation of quantum mechanics are illustrated by the familiar example
of a beam passing through multiple slits.
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In the consistent histories formulation of quantum mechanics [1, 2, 3],
one classifies certain sets of histories as being “consistent sets”, and then
identifies values of the decoherence functional as being the “probabilities”
of consistent histories. The consistency conditions ensure that, within any
single consistent set, the values of probabilities so obtained do have the
expected properties. However (as has been known from the beginning [1, 4],
and has recently been re-emphasized in [5, 6]), one will not necessarily get
sensible results if one combines the probabilities of histories in different sets.
Thus it is not clear how to interpret these “probabilities”.
Feynman has written [7] that “the only mystery” of quantum theory is
encountered in the example of a beam passing though multiple slits. Guided
by this insight, in this paper we will discuss such an example, to try to
illustrate (alas, not to resolve) some of the interpretational questions which
are raised in [5, 6].
So we consider, as shown in the figure, a beam of particles incident upon
a wall in which there are three slits, which we denote by S1, S2, and S3; each
slit may be either open or closed, as we choose. We will not be interested
in the entire diffraction pattern, and so we imagine that there is a single
detector called D at a fixed location on the far side of the wall. We will only
consider those events in which D registers the passage of a particle.
Define A1 to be the amplitude at D, in the case in which S1 is open while
S2 and S3 are both closed. The counting rate in this case is proportional to
|A1|
2. Make analogous definitions forA2 and forA3, and let A123 ≡ A1+A2+
A3. The counting rate when all slits are open is then proportional to |A123|
2.
In general |A123|
2 6= |A1|
2+|A2|
2+|A3|
2, and standard quantum theory does
not allow us to say that the particle did go through any particular slit.
If we wish, we can think of S1 and S2 as a single object, which we will
call S12 (it might be helpful, although not necessary, to imagine that there
were no separation between S1 and S2); below we will refer to this way of
thinking as “analysis α”. Define A12 ≡ A1+A2; then the counting rate when
S12 is open and S3 is closed is proportional to |A12|
2, and A123 = A12 +A3.
In general, there will be interference between A12 and A3, and standard
quantum theory does not allow us to say that the particle did go either
through S12 or through S3. Consider, however, the special case in which
A12 = 0. In this case, there is nothing for A3 to interfere with; A12 = 0
means that, if S12 is open and S3 is closed, the particle could not reach
D. We would surely be tempted, in this special case, to conclude that any
particle detected by D must have gone through S3.
Thus analysis α apparently enables us to say that, if A1 + A2 = 0,
2
particles detected by D must have gone through S3. Of course, instead of
analysis α, we could have thought of S2 and S3 as a single object (call this
analysis β), and then by an analogous argument have said that ifA2+A3 = 0,
particles detected by D must have gone through S1. Now consider the case
A1 = A3 = −A2; since A1 + A2 = 0, we conclude from analysis α that the
particle went through S3, and since A2+A3 = 0, we conclude from analysis
β that the particle went through S1. Could both conclusions be correct?
It seems that, when a particle could arrive at D by any of three paths,
we can get into trouble by asserting that the particle must have followed one
of the paths, even in the case in which the amplitudes of the other two paths
cancel. 1 It should be understood that there is nothing that is mysterious
going on here beyond the mysteries of good old quantum interference. How-
ever, those mysteries are so familiar to us that we often forget to be amazed
by them. Feynman, in discussing the two-slit experiment [7], stresses that,
because of quantum interference, we can not say that particles arriving at
D went through either of the two slits. We now see that this remains true
even when the amplitude for one of the slits vanishes.
This example, of particles passing through multiple slits, can of course be
expressed in the formalism of consistent histories. Let the particle initially
be in a pure state; then, with the condition A1 = A3 = −A2, the set of
four histories in which the particle goes through either S12 or S3, and then
is either detected by D or is not, is a consistent set. Consideration of this
set corresponds to analysis α discussed above. Within this set, the history
consisting of a particle going through S12 and then being detected has zero
probability (which follows immediately from the condition A12 = 0, and is
what ensures that the set is consistent), and so the conditional probability
for a detected particle to have gone through S3 has value one. Likewise,
the set of four histories in which the particle goes through either S1 or S23,
and then is either detected or not, is also a consistent set (corresponding
to analysis β). Within this set, the conditional probability for a detected
particle to have gone through S1 also has value one. In fact, this example is
one of the class of examples considered in [5, 6]; the contradiction referred
to in the title of [5] is between the retrodiction that a detected particle
1Even if there were only two slits, there could still be similar trouble. Suppose that
S1 were closed (so we need only consider S2 and S3), and suppose further that A2 = 0;
then we still could not conclude that a detected particle went through S3. This is because
S2 can be said to have an upper part and a lower part, and (using an obvious notation)
it could be that A3 = A2,upper = −A2,lower; then the fact that A3 + A2,lower = 0 could
equally-well lead us to conclude that the particle went through S2,upper.
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went through S3 and the retrodiction that it went through S1. In [6] this
contradiction is expressed in a different way, which in our example would be
the observation that we might conclude (using analysis α) that a detected
particle went through S3, and also (using analysis β) that it did not go
through S23. Since S3 is a part of S23, one would have thought that going
through S3 implied going through S23.
If we want to apply the consistent history formalism to a closed sys-
tem, and a fortiori if we want to apply it to the universe, we do not have
the option of refusing to accept any conclusion that is not verified by an
external measuring device. We are thus faced with the question of under
what circumstances and in what sense we should understand the “probabil-
ities” which are assigned to consistent histories. To answer this question,
several authors [2, 8, 9] have proposed versions of logic in which statements
would only have validity in the context of a given analysis. In our example,
this would amount to accepting, for a detected particle, both statements “In
analysis α, it went through S3” and “In analysis β, it went through S1”.
Then, if someone were to say to us “Now that you have made both analyses,
please tell me through which slit the particle really did go,” we would refer
him to [7].
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